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INCONSISTENCIES IN THE POLICIES  PURSUED BY Iq EMBE R STATES:
THE EXAMPLE  OF SUGAR
1. Need for sectoraL coordination  between the Communit and the deveL countries
n particular t CP States
Acting on a proposaL from Mr Cheysson, Mr Ortoti, Mr Gunde[ach, Mr Haferkamp  and
Mr Davignon, the Commission recentty adopted a Communication  to the CounciL (1)
drawing the Member Statest attention to certain pol.icies being foLtowed in the
deve[oping countries to promote industriaL investment. In many sectors there ras
a danger that the resuLting exports coutd cause serious probtems as regards pro-
fitabitity  and create disruption on the worLd or Community  market.
2. Sugar: an atarming exampLe
The Commission chose as its first  examp[e cane sugar: fourteen ACP States are aLready
Large-scaLe producers, and, aLong with other developing countries, are proposing to
step up their production considerabIy.
In many cases, fhey wiLt do this with financiaL support and technicaL assistange.from
European firms, thA fjnanciat support sometimes  beihg provided by one or more of the
Member States
Protocot No 3 to the Lom6 Convention on ACP sugar guarantees that 1.22 niLlion tonnes
of cane sugar wLL be purchased each year from the fourteen [isted ACP states at
internaI Community prices (see Annex I),  even though the Community is.itsetf  currentty
producing a surp[us (about 2.0 mjLtion tonnes per annum).
An examination .of the investment projects in progress or ptanned in the ACP States up
to 1981 reveats that:
i.  the vo[ume of ACP sugar avaiLable for export wiLl.'ihcrease  from the present
Levet of 2.0 miLLion tonnes to 2.9 ni ILjon tonnes;
ii.  two-thirds of these projects are receiving private- and pubLic-sector backing
from the Community. 
t
These deveLopments are aLL the more aLarming since the wortd market has a serious
structuraL surpLus, which is refLected in persistent[y depressed prices. At the
present price leveL, new undertakings  have no guarantee of profitabiLity (see Annex II).
3. Projects in progress or planned in the ACP States
It  is expected that by 1981 export capacity trjtt  have increased by 0.9 mi[lion tonnes!
Thisincrease witI come from 66 known projects - 44 backed by European firms -  supported
by th$ul L range of nationa L export pr<iniotion  measures.
t' (1) co{vr(78)623 .t .-2-
Five countrjes account fepa significant proportjon of the projected increase:
Quantitjes avai labLe for export (tonnes)
1978 1981 Firms(country  of origin)
CAMEROON  12 000  100 000  F /  uK
IVORYCOAST  O  160,000(1) BIDI  F/NL/UK
KENYA  O  1O5OOO  F/UK
SUDAN  O  187OOO  B/UK
SWAZILAND  216 OOO  359 OOO  D /  UK
i.e. an increase of 6831000 tonnes from onty five countries
It  'is'ctear, with the sugar market in its
expect further requests for inctusion in
indefinite period) and that, furthermore,
whatsoever in the quota taid down in the
Zambiars  request.
4. Conc Iusion
present state, that the Community must
the Sugar ProtocoL (conc[uded for arr'
it  cannot contempLate any increase
ProtocoL. This is the repLy it  gave to
The Commission therefore proposes that, in the sugar sector, which is being taken
as an exampte, there shouLd be fuLL coordination of atI the schemes being imp[e-
mented or o[anned which the Member States or indeed the Community (EDF, EIB) might
support directty or indirectLy. The attention of other financing bodies (Wor[d
Bank, African DeveLopment  Bank, etc.)is being drarn'to the'Cdrmi.ss'ionr.s conctusionir-
FinaILy, the Commissjon asks itseLf the foLtowing question: Can we go on accepting,
by pretending.the probLem does not exist, the inconsistency between bLanket
export aid policies - which are in themseLves perfectty understandabte -  and
the responsi'Ui tity  which tlre Member .States and the Community shouLd exercit"-Yjt-d*!
their Third tJorLd partners, particu[arLy  as regards the setection of sectors for
deve Iopment ?
,rrdn;3r603"i::.:l:n.  foreso three on four projects representins an additionat
..g1g-.:
2-  .' .  .-/
Tabteau I
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(1) en tonnes ndtriques - valeur sucre blanc
(2),pdriode de Iivraison sp6clale Jusgufau  31 '12'1977
(3) en tonnes valeur sucre brut






I +q ANNEX II
WORLD MARKET SITUATION
1. Figures
0ver the Last three sugar yeans, the wortd sugar market has deveLoped as
follows:  1000 t  rat^r sugar
5.,oturb".-Runrrtbrlrncu  1975176  *-1?75l7h  +'  1977l78(E'
InitiaL  Stock
Product'ion
Arrai LabLe quant it'ies
Consumption (1)
F ina L stock
of which: as % of consumPt'ion






















r(1) CaLculated by deducting the finaL stock from the avaiLabLe quantities"
Q) AnnuaL average JuLy/June  (London spot prices)'
Source: F0 Licht-European Sugar Journa[ (BaLance)
InternationaL Sugar 0rganization (IS0) (InternationaL  Trade)
(E): Est'imates{
-2-
Since the plice spiral durjng the 1974/75 sugar year;which  was caused by
a temporary shortage/'there has been a steady faLL in prices and an equa[[y
steady increase in siocks. At the end of the 1977/78 sugar yearr the 7
miLLion tonnes product'ion surpLus naised wor[d stocks to their highest LeveI
in 25 years.
At the same time, sugar projects are being impLemented throughout the
worLd, and partilutaiLy in the developing countriesn which can onLy
aggravate the market surptus, at Least in the short term, and keep worLd
piices at a leveL where production units cannot operate profitabLy'
worLd consumption is increasiAgt  6Lthough sLowLy, the rate being sLower
.in the industriaLized countries, where in some cases consumption is stagnating
or even dectining. The unknown factor is cLearly the future rate of increase
in the develoirini countriesrwhic!.ry1ith-a few except'ionsrnotabt)' arfton$ the cout
tries that are traditionaL suEal*r0ducerft'i LL have very Low consumption LeveIs-
(from T to 18 kS per head of plopula/ion against 34 to 50 kg in the industria::'
Lized countries). The rate of increase in demand in the deveLoping countries
wiLL LargeLy determine the futune of the worLd sugar economy-
2. Efforts for the L -term or nization of the ar market
The new Internationat Sugar Agreement (ISA) entered into force provisionatLy
only on 1 January 1978, ind ii  it  too soon for an assessment to be made of the
scooe of the economic measures it  contains (export quotas to reduce
internationa L suppLY)  "
There are, however, structuraL factors at work which do not exactty  heLp
towards tire effectiveness of these measures. The worLd sugar market has
aLways been subject to cycL'icaL fLuctuations,  which have dometimes  been
sudden and vioLenl" The reasons for this situation are numerous and compLex'
but it  i s possibLe -t-o po'int out a few:
'i. the worLd sugar market is a residuaL market (about 10% of prodqction);
ii.  the residuaL nature of this market considerabLy aggravates the risks
. arising,  one way or another, from the vagaries of cL'i mate;
iii.  the governments of most countries (whether they are pirrchasers  or
seLLers on the worLd market) intervene more or Less directLy'in
the formation of domest'ic pr"ices, and this has repercussions on
the trend of production and consequentty  on the formation of wortd
ma rket pri ces;
iv.  the re Lative pri ce 'ineLasti city of consumpt'ion,  at  Least in the indus-
triaLized countries-
observation  over a Long peniod reveaLs that,  in eight years out of ten, the-
market.is oversuppLied] which suggests that there is  structuraL overproduction
The effects of this  situat'ion on-irices is onLy too obvious/ espec'iaLLy for th
devetoping countrieS, which have fragi Le and Largely undiversified economies
and do not have the means to offset ih"s" effects in other sectors of the
economy. It  is  therefore on[y naturaL that these countries expect a great
deaL from the ISA
In the first  few months of application of the new ISA, and despite a
temporary recove.y in Januar'y'1978, there has been a signifjcant  and steady
decLine in spot prices, both'in paris for white sugar and 'in London for brown
sugar, while the quotaiion for brown sugar in New iork has been suspended sinc
Novembe r 1g77. This situation is  compt6tety different from that experienced
during the first  few months fol[owing the entry into force of the 1968
Agreement, when prices rose by 25%'-3-  6
Thenet",lsAmighthavebeenexpectedtohaveaconsiderabte
impact since tn" ini.oduction of export quotas was designed to reduce suppLies on
the worLd market by 4 miLLion tonnes, thereby obLiging exporting countries to
buiLd up stocks (with IMF faciLitiesi.  The reaLjti oi the situation has proved
verry djfferent, howeven, for between the end of the negotiations for the
Aqreement in OctoUe, tq?l and its entry into force on 1 January 1978 the
participating producer countries,  whic-h u,ere not yet bound by. the export quotast
no doubt used this period toreduce their stocks to a minimum by Large-scaLe sel  g'
These saLes brought about a drop-in the price of brown sugar at the end of 1977
and caused a fari"-number of imporiing countries to stock up'  The net resuLt was
a transfer of stocks from exporters to importers, which is bound to infLuence the
market situation in the short term.
There is IittLe encQuragement to be drawn from the factors described  above'
p,articuLarty if  it  is considered  that:
i"  aLthough the price cbjective set by the lsA in October 1977 was US6 242 per
tonne, ano'Jelpii. ,n-initi aL 15Y" reduction in the export quotas, the
average price per month in 1978 has been about us6 155 per tonne' a price
at which no production unit can cover its  costs'
ii.  the additonaL quant'ities of sugar wiLI be offered, despite a certain increase
in producerst consumption, on ihu "o.Ld 
"residuaL" market and wiLL aggravate
the downward pressure on prices. There is consequent[y a danger that the,
objectiu. pu..red by the introduction of export quotas may not be atta'ined'7
THE SITUATION ON THE COMMUNITY MARKET
ANNEX III
(in r000 t  white suga r equi va Lent )
1977/78 forecas'!s
EEC sugar batance
1976/ 77 Qa tember-October ba Lance
4 Production under quotas' A+B
2. Imports:


























as of 31 .12.76
4.
911
Account being taken of preferentiaL imports (ACPr 0cT, India), the community
baLance reveaLs that the quantities avaiLabLe for export increased tron 1'7
miLLion tonnes in  1g76/77 to 2.g miLLion tonnes in 1'g77r7g. The community s'ituatior
is therefore contribut'ing to the depressed state of the worLd market' and it  is
poss'ibLe that thi s situation may continue'
Furthermore, the Commun'ity is  LikeLy to ptace.increasing  pressure on the worLd
,,residuaL" market as Long as it  ;;;;  not'purticipate in-the ISA (which wouLd make
it  subject to certain obLigations)  and owing to the  fact that the traditionaL
"Afri can" out Let wi L L tend to become  sma L Ler'I
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TER D(ICUMEl{TIE II{FI|RMATIt|l{  MEM(|
INCOHERENCE ENTRE POLITIOUES  DE LA
LE CAS DU
Bruxettes, novembre 1978
COMMUNAUTE ET DES ETATS MEMBRES :
SUC RE
1. Ndcessite drune concentation  sectoriette entre communaut6 et pays
de d6veLoppement (PVD), nota.mment ACP
Sur proposition de MM. Cheysson, OrtoIi, G;rnrJeIachrHaferkamp et Davignon
La Commission vient dradopter une communication au Conseil (1) attirant
Irattention des Etats Membres sur [e danger de certaines poLitiques dren-
couragement  drinvestissements jndustrieLs des PVD dans de nombreux secteurs,
dont [es exportations risquent ensuite de poser des prob[6mes graves de
rentabiLit6 et des troubles sur Le marchd mondiaI ou communautaire.
2. Le cas du sucre : un exemple atarmant
La Commission a choisi comme premier exempte [e cas du sucre de canne dont
14 pays ACP sont d6je drimportants pnoducteurs et qui, comme dtautres PVD
aussi, envisagent des accroissements  consid6rabIes de teurs productions.
Ceci, souvent avec Le concours financier, parfois garanti et mtme assur6 par
un ou plus'ieurs Etats Membres - et Irassistance  technique drop6rateurs  europ6ens.
Le protocoLe  no 3 (sucre) annex6 d La Convention de Lom6 garantit aux 14 pays
ACP mentionnBs Irachat de 1r22 mitLion tonnes de sucre de canne par an aux prix
int6rieurs de la Communaute (cf. annexe 1), aLors m3me que sa propre production
est actueltement excddentaire (de Ifordre de 2r0 miILionde tonnes par an).
Drun examen de Ir6voLution des investissements en cours ou envisag6s  dans
[es ACP A ['horizon 1981, i I ressort que :
-  ta disponibilit6 A Irexportation de sucre des ACP passera de 2.000.000 tonnes
actuettement e 2.900.000 tonnes.
-  [es deux tiers de ces projets regoivent Lrappui pubIic et priv6 en provenance
de Ia Communaut6.
Cette 6votution est drautant pLus atarmante que te march6 mondiaI est en
situation drexc6dent structureL grave qui se traduit par une d6pression
durab[e des prix. A Ieur niveau actueL, aucune rentabiLit6 ntest assur6e aux
entneprises nouvettes (cf. annexe II).
3. Projets en cours ou envisag6s dans les Etats ACP
Le supptement gtobaI previsible  des exportations  vers 1981 est de Irordre de
0r9 niLLion de tonnes. II  proviendra de 66 projets identifi6s dont 44 avec te
concours d!operateurs europ6ens  soutenus par Lrarsenat des mesures poIitiques
internationaIes draide A ['exportation.
(1) Cotvl(78)6235 pays occupentune pIace signifjcative  :




























IL parait c[air que, dans Lt6tat actueL du march6 du sucre, [a Communaut6 doit
staitendr?, d,une part, a Crautres demandes dtinctusion dans Le protocoLe "sucre"
(conc[u pour une dur6e ind6tenmin6e)  et que, drautre part, eLte ne peut en-
visager ta moindre augmentat'ion du quota inscrit dans ce protoco[e.
Crest dans ce sens qureLLe a r6pondu i  [a demande de [a Zambie.
4. ConcLusion
Dans [e domaine sucrier, pris comme exemp[e, La Commission propose donc,
qurune concertation approfondie-soit organis6e sur toutes Ies actions men6es
ou envisag6es auxquetLes [es Etats Membres ou m6me [a Communautd (FED, BEI)
.pourraieni apporter un soutien direct ou indirect, en appeLant Irattention
dtautres organismes  de financement  sur ses concLusions  (Banque Mondiate,  Banque
Afri caine de DeveLoppement, etc... ).
En guise de concLusion, [a Commission se pose ta question :
"Pouvons-nous accepter pLus Longtemps, en pr6tendant trignorer, que se
poursuive Ltincoh6rence  entre des potitiques - parfaitement  compr6hensibtes
par ait[eurs - dtaide A tt'exportation tous azimuts et Irexercice de La nes-
ponsabitite qui incombe aux Etats membres et A La Communaut6 vis-i-vis de
Leurs partenaires du tiers monde, notamment en ce qu'i concerne Le chojx
des secteurs de d6ve[oppement?'t
(1) La CAte drlvoire pourrait renoncer A trois ou quatre projets qu'i reprdsentent
200,000 tonnes suppt6mentaires.ANNEXE  1
4r' n
Tabteau I
REPARTITION DES oUANTITES_  !484Nf-!_qS. (PRoToCoLE  "SUCRE")
J
(1) en tonnes m6triques - vateur sucre btanc
(2) p6rioce de tivraison speciale Jusqurau 31.12.1977
(3) en tcnneg vateur sucre brut
cf . P-58, rnai 1978
Ouotas attribu6s
pour 1977178 (1)
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Situaticn Cu march6 mondiaL
1- Donn6es quantitatives
Au cours des troi:; dernidres campagnes,
comme suit au niveau mondia[-
'Anrtexe I I
[e nrarch€ sucrier a 6vo[u6
en 1000 t  de :iuc"e brr.t
Bi Lan t enbre-ao0t
Stock de ddbut




dont : cn Z O" 
.,a 
consommat ion
Prix march6 mondiat Iibre (2)




















169 273.90 13C ,:r3
'l
-  *ne  prr difference entre tes quantitds dispon'ibtes et [e stock fin.r[,
(2) noyenne annueLl.e jui I [,rt/ juin (pn'ix "spot" Londres)
Source :  F0 uicht-Journat  euroceen des sucres (EiLan)
InternationaI Sugar Organization  (IS0)(Echanges Internationaux)
(E):  Estimations.\  l\t
t
/ -2-
Apr6s ta ftamb6e des prix pendant [a campagne 1971175 due A une
penurie momentanee, on a assistd depuis S un tassement rdgutier des
prix et 6 un accroissement tout aussi r6gu[ier des stocks. Au terme
de [a campagne 1977178, trexcddent de production de 7 mio tonnes a
porte les stocks mondiaux au niveau [e ptus 6tevd atteint depuis
25 ans.
Dans te mFne temps et partout dans te monde, ndmment dans Les PVD,
des projets sucriers sont mis en oeuvre qui ne peuvent qutaggraver
ta situation exc6dentaire du march6, au moins a court terme, et
conduire au maintien de prix mondiaux dont te niveau n'est pas
susceptibte d'assurer ta rr'ntabititd des exptoitations.
Du c6t€ de Ia s6n5qrnn,rtion gIobaIe, on constate qu'etie s'accrott
mais tentement, Itaccroiss€nre'61 etant pIus faibtq dans tes pays
industriaLises  ou parfois elte st.rgne et mOme r6gresse.  Lrinconnue
reste 6videmment Ie rythme d'accroissement futur de Ia consommation
des PVD, qui ont actueLtement, d quetques exceptions prds surtout dans
les pays traditionnetlement producteurs de sucre, des niveaux de
consommation  encore trds bas (Ce 7 e 18 kgs per capita contre J4
A 50 kgs dans les pays industrialis6s). La rdaIit6 de ce rythme
draccroissement de ta demande des PVD ddterminera  dans une targe
mesure t'avenir de t !Aconomie sucridre mondiate.
?. Les e{forts drorqeniqation )  tonS terne .  Le renouveL'tement de t'occord internationaI sur te sucre (AIS), ent16
en v'igueur A titre  prdviso'ir:e te 1.1.1978, est trop rdcent pour que l'on  ,-'
puisse appr6cier ta port6e des mesures 6conomiques que comporte cet
accord (quotas dtexportation  pour rdduire Iroffre  internationate).
Toutefois des facteurs structurels sont a Lfoeuvre qu'i ne favorjseni;
gut\re ttefficacite  de ce's nesures. Le r,r.:rchd mondjat du sqcre a toujour$
ete sujet A des ftuctu.:tions cycLiques. parfois soudaines et viotentes.
Les raisons de cette situation sont nombreuses et complexes. 06 peut
cependant en signater quetques unes :
te march6 mondiat du sucre est un marchd rdsiduel (de Lrordro de 10t
de la production,
-  te caractr!re 16sidueI de ce marchd rggrave, consid6rabtement tes risquet
16suttant, dans un sens ou dans Irautre, des at6as ctimatiques.
-  [es gouvernements de ta pIupart des pays (qufits  soient ache?eurs
ou vendeurs sur Ie marche mondiat) interviennent  ptus ou moills directgr'rqti
d,.rns ta form.rt ion des prix  interieurs,  ce qui a une r6percussion sur '
t'dvotution de ta production et par consdquent sur [a formation des prix
du rnarchd mondiat.
-  [a retative indtasticite de ta consommation aux prix  au moins dans
tcs pays industriatiseis.
Lrobservat ion  sur tongue pcir iode ri,vb l.e e,-re I  annCes sur 10, Le march$







dans un 6tat de surproduction structureIte. Les cons6quences de cette 
i
situation sur Ir6volution des prix nrest que trop 6vidente, surtout
pour les PVD dont Ies economies fragites et peu diversifi6es  nront pa3
les.noyens de trouver des compensations  dans d'autres secteurs de  :
leurs dconomies. It  est donc normat que ces pays mettent de grands
espoirs dans IrAIS.
0?, tes premiers mois drappLication  du nouvet AIS ont connu,
matgr6 une reprise temporaire en janvier 1978, une d6gradation
sensibte et continue des prix "spot", aussi bien ir Paris pour [e blanc
qurA Londres pour Les roux, tandis que [a cotatjon du roux i  Nev York  rt  *
est suspendue depuis novembre 1977. Cette situation est totatement diffdrente
de ceLte constatde durant Ies premiers mois suivant [a mise en
v'igueur de traccord de 1968 o0 ta progression des cours avait 6td
de 25I.
Pourtant, tt imp,rct du ncuvet AIS aurait pu €tre considcirabte
puisque ta mise en ptace de quotas A Irexportation devait reduire
t'offre sur te march€'mondiaL  de r+ mio de tonnes, en obligeant [es pays
exportateurs A stocker (avec des facil.i6s du FitlI). llais ta 16atite a Ste
toute differente, car entre_ta fin de ta negociation de Iraccord en
octobre 1977 et son entr6e en vigueur te 1.1.1978, les pays producteurs
membres, non encore soumi s aux quot.)s dtexportat ion, ont s,Jns doute
mis A profit cb deta.i pour reduire [eurs stocks au minimum p,rr des
ventes massives. Ces vr.ntes ont entraind [a baisse de ta v.rteur du roul
A ta fin de 1977, ce qui a incit6 de nombreux pays importate'urs  A se
couvrir par anticipation et a donc provoqu6 un d6placement des stocks
des exportateurs vers Ies importateurs, ce qui nrest pas ens consdquence
pour ttavenir imm6diat.
Lrensembte des e ti.r'rerE rappe lri s c i-dessus est bien peu encouragpiro3 r
en particutier si ['on cgnsidere que :
-  t'objectif de prix fixe par t|AIS en octobre 1977 est de 21? Sltonne
ators que, matg16 unc, prcmiire reduction de 151 des quoto5 drexporti,tion,
[e prix moyen au mois de 1978 se situe A environ 155 8/tonne, prir
auquet aucune entrepnise ne peut couvrif.ses co0ts de production.
-  Les quantit6s supp[6rentaires  de sucre seront offertes, ma[916 unc (trtainc
ougmentation de Ia ccnsormatjon  des productrlurs, suf [e marchd
"16sidue[" mondiat et aggraveront ta pression a ta baisse. Dds Lors
ttobjectif poursuivi par Irinstauration de quotas A Irexportation






La Situation Cu marche communautaire
Bitan sucrier CEE
Bi t.rn octobre_seot  enrbre
1. Production  dans Ie cadre
desquotasA+8)
?. Importations :
-  des Etats ACP,PTOM  et
de t I Inde




























5. Stocks A trintervention
Le bi Ian com'rrun,]uta i 1e, en tenant conrpte des impoftat ions pref erent' el IeS
(ACPrPTOtttrInde)  se traCu jt  prr une auctnentation  des quant itEs disponihte;;
J [f exportation de 1,7 nio tonnes en 1976/77 e ?rB mio tonnes en 19'7717E o 4
La situation de la Comnunaute contribue  donc a aggraver Ie caracter€
dcspressif du marche rrrondial, et Iron ne peut exc[ure que cette situatlon
se proLonge.
En outre, [a Communaute, risque de peser de ptus en plus sur [t
m.rrchS "rdsiduet" mondiaI tant qu'eIte ne sera pas membre de IrAIS
(et dcnc soumise i  certaines obligations) et du fait  que te ddltouchd
tradit'ionne[ "af ri cain" tendra ii se r6dui re.
(1) Periode de Iivra'ison juitIet-juin